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Abstract
We introduce a game-theoretic framework to study the hypothesis testing problem, in the presence
of an adversary aiming at preventing a correct decision. Specifically, the paper considers a scenario in
which an analyst has to decide whether a test sequence has been drawn according to a probability mass
function (pmf) PX or not. In turn, the goal of the adversary is to take a sequence generated according
to a different pmf and modify it in such a way to induce a decision error. PX is known only through
one or more training sequences. We derive the asymptotic equilibrium of the game under the assumption
that the analyst relies only on first order statistics of the test sequence, and compute the asymptotic
payoff of the game when the length of the test sequence tends to infinity. We introduce the concept
of indistinguishability region, as the set of pmf’s that can not be distinguished reliably from PX in
the presence of attacks. Two different scenarios are considered: in the first one the analyst and the
adversary share the same training sequence, in the second scenario, they rely on independent sequences.
The obtained results are compared to a version of the game in which the pmf PX is perfectly known to
the analyst and the adversary.
Index Terms
Hypothesis testing, adversarial signal processing, cybersecurity, game theory, source identification,
multimedia forensics, counter-forensics.
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Binary Hypothesis Testing Game with Training
Data
I. INTRODUCTION
Hpothesis testing is a widely studied topic with applications in virtually all technological and scientific
fields. In its most basic form, an analyst is asked to decide which among two hypotheses, usually referred
to as null hypothesis (or H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1), is true based on a set of observables, say
xn = (x1, x2 . . . xn). Several versions of the problem are obtained according to the knowledge that the
analyst has on the probability distribution of the observables when one of the two hypotheses holds. In
some cases, the probability mass function (pmf)1 conditioned to the two hypotheses is known, in other
cases only the pmf under H0 is known, in yet other cases only a number of sample observables (hereafter
referred to as training sequences) obtained under H0 and H1 are available.
Due to its importance, hypothesis testing has been extensively studied and a solid theoretical framework
has been built permitting to analyze and understand its many facets. In the last years, though, many
applications have emerged in which hypothesis testing is given a new twist, due to the presence of an
adversary aiming at making the test fail. In multimedia forensics [1], for instance, a forensic analyst
may be asked to decide whether an image has been acquired by a given camera, notwithstanding the
presence of an adversary aiming at deleting the acquisition traces left by the camera. In the same way,
the analyst may be asked to decide whether a signal has undergone a certain processing or not, by taking
into account the possibility that someone deliberately tried to delete the traces left during the processing
phase.
Another popular example comes from spam filtering [2], wherein an anti-spam filter is presented with
a test e-mail and must decide whether the e-mail contains a genuine or a spam message. It is obvious
that such a test can not neglect the presence of an adversary trying to shape the message in such a way
to fool the filter.
Biometric authentication provides a further example. In this case the authentication system must decide
1Since in the rest of the paper we will assume that the elements of xn belong to a finite alphabet, we prefer to use the term
probability mass function instead of probability density function, even if at this stage we do not need to restrict our attention to
the discrete case.
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whether a biometric template belongs to a certain individual, despite the opposite efforts of an attacker
aiming at building a fake template that passes the authentication test [3], [4].
Other examples include: watermarking, where the detector is asked to decide whether a document
contains a given watermark or not [5], steganalysis, in which the steganalyzer has to distinguish between
cover and stego images [6], network intrusion detection, wherein anomalous traffic conditions must be
distinguished from normal ones [7], reputation systems [8], for which it is essential to distinguish between
genuine and malevolent scores, anomaly detection, cognitive radio [9], and many others. In all these fields,
the system designer has to take into account the presence of one or more adversaries explicitly aiming
at system failure.
In the framework depicted above, the goal of this paper is to move a first step towards the construction of
a general theoretical framework to analyze the binary hypothesis testing problem by taking into account
the presence of an adversary aiming at impeding a correct decision. More specifically, we introduce
and analyze an adversarial version of the Neyman-Pearson setup in which an analyst and an adversary,
hereafter referred to as the Defender (D) and the Attacker (A), face each other in a rigorously defined
context. As in the classical Neyman-Pearson scenario, we assume that the type-I error probability (i.e.,
the probability of rejecting H0 when H0 holds) is in some way fixed and that D and A are interested
in minimizing, res. maximizing, the type-II error probability (i.e. the probability that the analyst accepts
H0 when H1 holds). In order to do so, we adopt a game-theoretic framework, in which the defender and
the attacker have opposite goals and operate by satisfying a different set of requirements, all together
specifying the nature of the game. The final goal will be the derivation of the optimum strategies for
the defender and the attacker in terms of game equilibrium points, and the study of the achievable
performance at the equilibrium.
A. Prior art
The use of game theory to model the impact that the presence of an adversary has on (binary) hypothesis
testing is not an absolute novelty. In many security oriented fields in which hypothesis testing plays a
central role, game theory has been advocated to avoid entering a cat and mouse loop in which researchers
alternatively play the role of the defender and the attacker, and continuously develop new countermeasures,
each time by attacking a specific algorithm or strategy.
By referring to multimedia forensics, in [10] Bo¨hme and Kirchner cast the forensic problem in a
hypothesis testing framework. Several versions of the problem are defined according to the particular
hypothesis being tested, including distinction between natural and computer generated images, ma-
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nipulation detection, source identification. Counter-forensics is then defined as a way to degrade the
performance of the hypothesis test envisaged by the analyst. By relying on arguments similar to those
used in steganography and steganalysis [11], Bo¨hme and Kirchner argue that the divergence between the
probability density functions of the observed signals after the application of the counter-forensic attack
is a proper way to measure the effectiveness of the attack. Noticeably, such measure does not depend
on the particular investigation technique adopted by the analyst. Even if Bo¨hme and Kirchner do not
explicitly use a game-theoretic formulation, their attempt to decouple the counter-attack from a specific
forensic strategy can be seen as a first - implicit - step towards the definition of the equilibrium point of a
general multimedia forensics game. Another work loosely related to the present paper is [12], where the
authors introduce a game-theoretic framework to evaluate the effectiveness of a given attacking strategy
and derive the optimum countermeasures. As opposed to our analysis, in [12] the attacker’s strategy
is fixed and the game-theoretic framework is used only to determine the optimum parameters of the
forensic analysis and the attack, thus failing to provide a complete characterization of the game between
the attacker and the analyst.
Game theory and information theory have been used in watermarking to model the interplay be-
tween the watermaker and the attacker. In [13], [14], [15], the game is played between the watermark
embedder/decoder and an attacker who attempts to degrade the embedded message by modifying the
watermarked signal, e.g. by adding some noise. The payoff of the game is usually the capacity of the
watermark channel. A problem that is closer to the one addressed in this paper is the one considered in
[16], where the jointly optimum embedding and detection strategies for a detector with limited resources
are derived. Indeed, the approach used in the present paper is reminiscent of the analysis carried out in
[16], given that in both cases the analysis focuses on an asymptotic version of the problem in which the
resources available to the defender are limited. As opposed to the present work, however, the analysis
in [16] is carried out under the assumption that no attack is present or that the attack channel is fixed,
and the resort to a min-max optimization is due only to the necessity of finding the jointly optimum
watermark embedding and detection strategies.
The work that is most closely related to the present paper is [17], where the source identification
game with known statistics is introduced and the corresponding asymptotic Nash equilibrium derived. As
a matter of fact, even if [17] restricts the analysis to multimedia forensics, the framework adopted to model
the game between the forensic analyst and the adversary is very general and can also be used to model
a binary hypothesis testing problem in which the statistics of the observables under the null hypothesis
are perfectly known to the defender and the attacker. In order to avoid replicating the analysis carried
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out in [17], by incorporating only the few modifications needed to extend it from multimedia forensics
to general hypothesis testing, here we focus on a different version of the game in which the statistics
of the observables under H0 are known only through training data. This represents a major deviation
from [17], requiring a thorough reformulation of the problem and a new derivation of the equilibrium
point. In order to make the current paper self-contained and allow the reader to better appreciate the
difference between the results obtained in [17] and the new findings provided here, we summarize the
main definitions and results of [17] in Section III.
B. Contribution
With the above ideas in mind, in this paper we address the following problem, hereafter referred to as
the binary hypothesis testing problem with training data (HTtr). Let X ∼ PX be a discrete memoryless
(DM) source ruling the emission of observables under H0, and let xn be a test sequence, i.e., a sequence
of observables. The goal of the defender is to accept or reject hypothesis H0, that is, to decide whether
xn was drawn from X or not2. In doing so, D must ensure that the type-I error probability does not
exceed a predefined value. Let then Y ∼ PY be a second DM source and let yn = (y1, y2 . . . yn) be a
sequence generated by Y . It is the aim of A to transform yn into a new sequence zn in such a way that
when presented with zn the defender accepts H0. We also impose that A satisfies a distortion constraint
requiring that the distance between yn and zn is below a certain threshold. As opposed to [17], D and A
do not know the exact statistics of PX and PY , since all they know is a training sequence drawn from
X.
Given the above scenario, the goal of this paper is to propose a rigorous game-theoretic framework to
cast the HTtr problem in, and derive the asymptotic equilibrium point of the game under a simplifying
hypothesis about the kind of analysis which D can carry out. We will do so for two different versions
of the game stemming from different assumptions about the relationship between the training sequence
available to the defender and that available to the attacker. In a first case, we will assume that A and
D share the same training sequence, while in the second part of the paper we will assume that the two
sequences are generated independently from each other. The main results proven in the paper can be
summarized as follows:
1) We show that under the limited resources assumptions [16], the HTtr game admits an asymptotic
2In order to keep the notation as light as possible, we use the symbol xn to indicate the test sequence even if, in principle,
it is not known whether xn originated from X or not.
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equilibrium. We also prove that the asymptotic equilibrium point is the only rationalizable equilib-
rium of the game [18], [19]. Such an equilibrium is much stronger than the usual notion of Nash
equilibrium, since the strategies corresponding to such an equilibrium are the only ones that two
rationale players may adopt (Theorem 3, Section V);
2) We compute the payoff at the equilibrium for the defender and the attacker, and introduce the notion
of indistinguishability region, defined as the region with the PY ’s that can not be distinguished
reliably (i.e. with a vanishing type II error probability) from PX (Theorem 4, Section VI);
3) We compare the achievable payoff of the HTtr game with the results obtained in [17], where D
and A have a perfect knowledge of PX , showing that the HTtr game is more favorable to the
attacker with respect to the situation analyzed in [17] (Theorem 5, Section VI);
4) We show that the indistinguishability region is the same when D and A share the same training
sequence and when they rely on independent sequences (Theorem 6, Section VII).
With regard to 1), the asymptotic equilibrium point when D and A rely on the same training sequence was
already derived in [20], without realizing that the equilibrium is indeed stronger than a Nash equilibrium.
The case of independent training sequences has never been studied before. The methodology used to derive
the equilibrium point goes along the same lines used in [16] to derive the jointly optimum watermark
embedding and detection strategy. Finally, the optimum strategy of the defender can be paralleled to
the results obtained in [21], even if in a completely different context. As to point 2), our results are
closely related to Sanov’s theorem [22], [23], however, to the best of our knowledge, their derivation in
a game-theoretic context is not trivial and represents an original contribution of the present paper.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the notation and definitions
used throughout the paper. In Section III, we recall the main results proved in [17] by casting them into
a hypothesis testing framework. Such results represent the baseline against which we will compare the
new results obtained in this paper. In Section IV, we formally introduce the HTtr game and lay the
basis for the analysis carried out in the subsequent sections. Section V is devoted to the derivation of the
equilibrium point of the HTtr game when A and D share the same training sequence. The payoff at the
equilibrium is analyzed in Section VI, where we also introduce the notion of indistinguishability region.
The case of independent training sequences is analyzed in Section VII. The paper ends in Section VIII,
with some conclusions and hints for future research. Some of the most technical proofs are given in the
the appendix, so to avoid interrupting the main flow of ideas.
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II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
In the rest of this work we will use capital letters to indicate discrete memoryless sources (e.g. X).
Sequences of length n drawn from a source will be indicated with the corresponding lowercase letters
(e.g. xn). In the same way, we will indicate with xi, i = 1, n the i−th element of a sequence xn. The
alphabet of an information source will be indicated by the corresponding calligraphic capital letter (e.g.
X ). Calligraphic letters will also be used to indicate classes of information sources (C). The pmf of a
discrete memoryless source X will be denoted by PX . The same notation will be used to indicate the
probability measure ruling the emission of sequences from a source X, so we will use the expressions
PX(a) and PX(xn) to indicate, respectively, the probability of symbol a ∈ X and the probability that
the source X emits the sequence xn, the exact meaning of PX being always clearly recoverable from
the context wherein it is used. Given an event A (be it a subset of X or X n), we will use the notation
PX(A) to indicate the probability of the event A under the probability measure PX .
Our analysis relies extensively on the concepts of type and type class defined as follows (see [22] and
[24] for more details). Let xn be a sequence with elements belonging to an alphabet X . The type Pxn
of xn is the empirical pmf induced by the sequence xn, i.e. ∀a ∈ X , Pxn(a) = 1n
∑n
i=1 δ(xi, a), where
δ(xi, a) = 1 if xi = a and zero otherwise. In the following we indicate with Pn the set of types with
denominator n, i.e. the set of types induced by sequences of length n. Given P ∈ Pn, we indicate with
T (P ) the type class of P , i.e. the set of all the sequences in X n having type P .
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between two distributions P and Q on the same finite alphabet
X is defined as:
D(P ||Q) =
∑
a∈X
P (a) log
P (a)
Q(a)
, (1)
where, as usual, 0 log 0 = 0 and p log p/0 =∞ if p > 0.
A. Hypothesis testing framework
Given a sequence xn ∈ X n, as a result of the test, X n is partitioned into two complementary regions Λ
and Λc, such that for xn ∈ Λ the defender decides in favor of H0, while for xn ∈ Λc H1 is preferred. We
say that a Type-I error occurs if H1 is chosen even if H0 holds. In the same way, we say that a Type-II
error occurs when H1 holds but H0 is chosen. In the following, we will refer to Type-I errors as false
positive errors (or false alarms) and to Type-II as false negative (or missed detection), and will indicate
the probability of such events as Pfp and Pfn respectively. The motivation for such a terminology comes
from applications in which H0 is seen as a standard situation and its rejection in favor of H1 raises an
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alarm since something unusual happened. It goes without saying that our derivation remains valid even
in different scenarios where the false positive and false negative terms may not be appropriate. In our
analysis we are mainly interested in the asymptotic behavior of Pfp and Pfn when n tends to infinity.
In particular we define the false positive (λ) and false negative (ε) error exponents as follows:
λ = lim
n→∞
−
log Pfp
n
; ε = lim
n→∞
−
logPfn
n
, (2)
where the log’s are taken in base 2.
B. Game Theory
As we said, the goal of this paper is to model the binary hypothesis testing problem in an adversarial
setting as a 2-player game. More formally, a 2-player game is defined as a 4-uple G(S1,S2, u1, u2),
where S1 = {s1,1 . . . s1,n1} and S2 = {s2,1 . . . s2,n2} are the set of strategies (actions) the first and the
second player can choose from, and ul(s1,i, s2,j), l = 1, 2, is the payoff of the game for player l, when
the first player chooses the strategy s1,i and the second chooses s2,j . A pair of strategies (s1,i, s2,j) is
called a profile. In a zero-sum competitive game, the two payoff functions are strictly related to each
other since for any profile we have u1(s1,i, s2,j) + u2(s1,i, s2,j) = 0. In other words, the win of a player
is equal to the loss of the other. In the particular case of a zero-sum game, then, only one payoff function
needs to be defined. Without loss of generality we can specify the payoff of the first player (generally
indicated by u), with the understanding that the payoff of the second player u2 is equal to −u. In the
most common formulation, the sets S1, S2 and the payoff functions are assumed to be known to both
players. In addition, it is assumed that the players choose their strategies before starting the game so that
they have no hints about the strategy actually chosen by the other player (strategic game).
A common goal in game theory is to determine the existence of equilibrium points, i.e. profiles
that, in some sense represent a satisfactory choice for both players. While there are many definitions of
equilibrium, the most famous and commonly adopted is the one due by Nash [25], [26]. For the particular
case of a 2-player game, a profile (s1,i∗ , s2,j∗) is a Nash equilibrium if:
u1((s1,i∗ , s2,j∗)) ≥ u1((s1,i, s2,j∗)) ∀s1,i ∈ S1
u2((s1,i∗ , s2,j∗)) ≥ u2((s1,i∗ , s2,j)) ∀s2,j ∈ S2,
(3)
where for a zero-sum game u2 = −u1. In practice, a profile is a Nash equilibrium if each player does
not have any interest in changing its choice assuming the other does not change its strategy.
Despite its popularity, the practical meaning of Nash equilibrium points is difficult to grasp, since
there is no guarantee that the players will end up playing at the equilibrium. This is particularly evident
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when more than one Nash equilibrium exists. A definition of game equilibrium with a more practical
meaning can be obtained by relying on the notion of dominant and dominated strategies. A strategy is
said to be strictly dominant for one player if it is the best strategy for the player, no matter how the
other player may play. In a similar way, we say that a strategy sl,i is strictly dominated by strategy
sl,j , if the payoff achieved by player l choosing sl,i is always lower than that obtained by playing sl,j
regardless of the choice made by the other player. The recursive elimination of dominated strategies is
one common technique for solving games. In the first step, all the dominated strategies are removed from
the set of available strategies, since no rational player would ever play them. In this way a new smaller
game is obtained. At this point, some strategies, that were not dominated before, may be dominated in
the remaining game, and hence are eliminated. The process goes on until no dominated strategy exists
for any player. A rationalizable equilibrium is any profile which survives the iterated elimination of
dominated strategies. If at the end of the process only one profile is left, the remaining profile is said
to be the only rationalizable equilibrium of the game, which is also the only Nash equilibrium point.
The corresponding strategies are the only rational choice for the two players and we say that the game
is dominance solvable. Dominance solvable games are easy to analyze since, under the assumption of
rational players, we can anticipate that the players will choose the strategies corresponding to the unique
rationalizable equilibrium [27].
III. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING GAME
WITH KNOWN SOURCES
In this section, we use the framework introduced in [17] to define a version of the hypothesis testing
game in which the pmf’s ruling the emission of sequences from X and Y are known to both D and A.
We also summarize the main results proven in [17], so to ease the comparison with the new results that
will be proven in the rest of the paper.
Let X and Y be two DM sources with the same alphabet X . Let yn be a sequence drawn from Y and
let zn be a modified version of yn produced by A in the attempt to deceive D. The binary hypothesis
testing game under the known source assumption (HTks) is defined as follows.
Definition 1. The HTks(SD,SA, u) game is a zero-sum, strategic, game played by D and A, defined by
the following strategies and payoff.
• The set of strategies D can choose from is the set of acceptance regions Λ for which the false positive
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probability is below a certain threshold:
SD = {Λ : PX(x
n /∈ Λ) ≤ Pfp}. (4)
• The set of strategies A can choose from is formed by all the functions that map a sequence yn ∈ X n
into a new sequence zn ∈ X n subject to a distortion constraint:
SA = {f(y
n) : d(yn, zn) ≤ nD}, (5)
where d(·, ·) is a proper distance measure and D is the maximum allowed per-letter distortion.
• The payoff function is defined as the false negative error probability (Pfn), namely:
u(Λ, f) = −Pfn = −
∑
yn:f(yn)∈Λ
PY (y
n). (6)
Given the difficulty of studying the game defined above, a simplified version of the game is introduced
in [17] wherein the set of strategies available to D is limited. More specifically, the so-called limited
resources assumption is introduced, forcing D to base its analysis only on first order statistics of xn.
Stated in another way, it is required that Λ is a union of type classes. Since a type class is univocally
defined by the empirical probability mass function of the sequences contained in it, the acceptance region
Λ can be seen as a union of types P ∈ Pn. As an additional simplification, the constraint on the false
positive probability is defined in asymptotic terms, requiring that Pfp decreases exponentially fast with
a given decay rate. All these considerations lead the following definition:
Definition 2. The HT lrks(SD,SA, u) game is a game between D and A defined by the following strategies
and payoff:
SD = {Λ ∈ 2
Pn : Pfp ≤ 2
−λn}, (7)
SA = {f(y
n) : d(yn, f(yn)) ≤ nD}, (8)
u(Λ, f) = −Pfn, (9)
where 2Pn indicates the power set of Pn. From the analysis given in [17] we know the following
results.
Theorem 1. The profile (Λ∗ks, f∗ks) with
Λ∗ks =
{
P ∈ Pn : D(P ||PX) < λ− |X |
log(n+ 1)
n
}
, (10)
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and
f∗ks(y
n) = arg min
zn:d(zn,ym)≤nD
D(Pzn ||PX). (11)
defines an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for the HT lrks game.
As a matter of fact, from the proof given in [17], it is easy to see that (Λ∗ks, f∗ks) is the only rationalizable
equilibrium of the game and hence HT lrks is a dominance solvable game.
A fundamental consequence of Theorem 1 is that the optimum strategies for D and A do not depend on
PY hence making the assumption that PY is known irrelevant. With a few modifications, then, Theorem
1 can be applied to a composite hypothesis testing scenario in which only the pmf conditioned to H0 is
known [28].
The second main result proven in [17] regards the payoff at the equilibrium, and specifies under which
conditions it is possible for D to devise a decision strategy such that Pfn tends to zero exponentially fast
when n tends to infinity. Let Γnks be defined as follows:
Γnks={P ∈ Pn : ∀y
n ∈ T (P ),∃zn ∈ Λ∗ks s.t. d(y
n, zn) ≤ nD} (12)
and let the asymptotic version of Γnks be defined as
Γ∞ks = cl
(⋃
n
Γnks
)
, (13)
where cl(S) indicates the closure of the set S. The following theorem holds:
Theorem 2. For the HT lrks game, the error exponent of the false negative error probability at the
equilibrium is given by:
εks = min
P∈Γ∞ks
D(P ||PY ), (14)
leading to the following cases:
1) εks = 0, if PY ∈ Γ∞ks;
2) εks 6= 0, if PY /∈ Γ∞ks.
where εks indicates the false negative error exponent at the equilibrium. Given two pmf’s PX and PY ,
a distortion constraint D and the desired false positive error exponent λ, Theorem 2 permits to understand
whether D may ever succeed to make the false negative error probability vanishingly small and thus win
the game. As a matter of fact, this is possible only if PY /∈ Γ∞ks, since otherwise εks = 0. We will call
Γ∞ks the indistinguishability region for PX , i.e. set of sources that under certain conditions (summarized
by D and λ) are not distinguishable from PX .
March 19, 2018 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 11
IV. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING GAME
WITH TRAINING DATA
The analysis carried out in [17] requires that PX and PY are known to D and A (as we have seen in
the previous section, in the asymptotic case only the knowledge of PX is required). To get closer to a
realistic scenario, we now remove this assumption introducing the hypothesis testing game with training
data.
Let C be the class of discrete memoryless sources with alphabet X , and let X ≃ PX be a source in
C. As for the HTks game, the goal of D is to decide whether a test sequence xn was drawn from X
or not. To make his decision, D relies on the knowledge of a training sequence tND drawn from X. On
his side, A takes a sequence yn emitted by another source Y ≃ PY still belonging to C and tries to
modify it in such a way that D thinks that the modified sequence was generated by the same source that
generated tND . As usual, the attacker must satisfy a distortion constraint stating that the distance between
the modified sequence and yn must be lower than a threshold. Like the defender, A knows PX through
a training sequence tKA , that in general may not coincide with tND . We assume that tND , tKA , xn and yn are
generated independently. With regard to PY , we could also assume that it is known through two training
sequences, one available to A and one to D, however we will see that - as for known sources and at
least in the asymptotic case - such an assumption is not necessary, and hence we take the simplifying
assumption that PY is known to neither D nor A. Let, then, H0 be the hypothesis that the test sequence
has been generated by the same source that generated tND and let Λ be the acceptance region for H0.
In the following, we will find convenient to think of Λ as a subset of X n × XN , i.e., as the set of all
the pairs of sequences (xn, tND) that the defender considers to be drawn from the same source. With the
above ideas in mind, and by paralleling the definition given in Section III, we define a first version of
the binary hypothesis testing game with training sequences as follows:
Definition 3. The HTtr,a(SD,SA, u) game is a zero-sum, strategic, game played by D and A, defined by
the following strategies and payoff.
• The set of strategies D can choose from is the set of acceptance regions Λ for which the maximum
false positive probability across all possible PX ∈ C is lower than a given threshold:
SD = {Λ : max
PX∈C
PX{(x
n, tND) /∈ Λ} ≤ Pfp}, (15)
where Pfp is a prescribed maximum false positive probability, and where PX{(xn, tND) /∈ Λ}
indicates the probability that two independent sequences generated by X do not belong to Λ. Note
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that the acceptance region is defined as a union of pairs of sequences, and hence Λ ⊂ X n × XN .
• The set of strategies A can choose from is formed by all the functions that map a sequence yn
generated by Y into a new sequence zn subject to a distortion constraint:
SA = {f(y
n, tKA ) : d(y
n, f(yn, tKA )) ≤ nD}, (16)
where d(·, ·) is a proper distance function and D is the maximum allowed per-letter distortion. Note
that the function f(·) depends on tKA , since when performing his attack A can exploit the knowledge
of his training sequence.
• The payoff function is defined in terms of the false negative error probability, namely:
u(Λ, f) = −Pfn = −
∑
tND∈X
N , tKA∈X
K
yn:(f(yn,tKA ),t
N
D)∈Λ
PY (y
n)PX(t
N
D)PX (t
K
A ), (17)
where the error probability is averaged across all possible yn and training sequences and where
we have exploited the independence of yn, tND and tKA .
A. Discussion
Before going on with the analysis, we pose to discuss some of the choices we implicitly made with
the above definition.
A first observation regards the payoff function. As a matter of fact, the expression in (17) looks
problematic, since its evaluation requires that the pmf’s PX and PY are known, however this is not the
case in our scenario since we have assumed that PX is known only through tND and tKA , and that PY is
not known at all. As a consequence it may seem that the players of the game are not able to compute the
payoff associated to a given profile and hence have no arguments upon which they can base their choice.
While this is indeed a problem in a generic setup, we will show later on in the paper that asymptotically
(when n, N and K tend to infinity) the optimum strategies of D and A are uniformly optimum across all
PX and PY and hence the ignorance of PX and PY is not a problem. One may wonder why we did not
define the payoff under a worst case assumption (from D’s perspective) on PX and/or PY . The reason is
that doing so would result in a meaningless game. In fact, given that X and Y are drawn from the same
class of sources C, the worst case for D would always correspond to X = Y for which no meaningful
decision is possible3.
3Alternatively, we could assume that X and Y belong to two disjoint source classes CX and CY . We leave this analysis for
further research.
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As a second remark, we stress that we decided to limit the strategies available to A to deterministic
functions of yn. This may seem a limiting choice, however we will see in the subsequent sections that,
at least asymptotically, the optimum strategy of D depends neither on the strategy chosen by A nor on
PY , then, it does not make sense for A to adopt a randomized strategy to confuse D.
A last, even more basic, comment regards the overall structure of the game. In our definition we
assumed that the attacker does not intervene when H0 holds, since we restricted his interest to the false
negative error probability. An alternative approach could be to let the attacker modify also the sequences
generated by X in the attempt to increase the false positive rate. We could also depart from the Neyman-
Pearson set up and define the payoff in terms of the overall error probability, or the overall Bayes risk
defined on the basis of suitable cost functions associated to the two kinds of errors4. While these are
interesting research directions, in this paper we restrict our analysis to the game specified by Definition
3, and leave the alternative approaches for future research.
B. Game variants
Two different variants of the HTtr,a game are obtained by assuming a different relationship between
the training sequences. In certain cases, we may assume that D has a better access to the source X than
A (see [29] for a multimedia forensics scenario in which such an assumption holds quite naturally). In
our framework, we can model such a situation by assuming that the sequence tKA is a subsequence of
tND , leading to the following definition.
Definition 4. The HTtr,b(SD,SA, u) game is a zero-sum, strategic, game defined as the HTtr,a game
with the only difference that tKA = (tA,l+1, tA,l+2 . . . tA,l+K) with l and K known to D.
Yet another variant is obtained by assuming that the training sequence available to A is equal to that
available to D.
Definition 5. The HTtr,c(SD,SA, u) game is a zero-sum, strategic, game defined as the HTtr,a game
with the only difference that K = N and tKA = tND (simply indicated as tN in the following). The set of
strategies of D and A are the same as in the HTtr,a game, while the payoff is redefined as:
u(Λ, f) = −Pfn = −
∑
tN∈XN
yn:(f(yn,tN ),tN )∈Λ
PY (y
n)PX(t
N ). (18)
4In this case it would be necessary that the a-priori probabilities of the two hypotheses are known.
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In the rest of the paper we will first focus on version c of the game, and then extend our results so to
cover version a as well.
C. Hypothesis testing game with limited resources
Studying the existence of an equilibrium point for the HTtr,c game is a prohibitive task, hence we
use the same approach adopted in [16], [17] and consider a simplified version of the game in which D
can only base his decision on a limited set of statistics computed on the test and training sequences.
Specifically, we require that D relies only on the relative frequencies with which the symbols in X appear
in xn and tN , i.e. Pxn and PtN . Note that Pxn and PtN are not sufficient statistics for D, since even if
Y is a memoryless source, the attacker could introduce some memory within the sequence as a result
of the application of f(·). In the same way he could introduce some dependencies between the attacked
sequence zn and tN . It is then necessary to treat the assumption that D relies only on Pxn and PtN as
an explicit requirement.
Following [16] and [17], we call this version of the game hypothesis testing with limited-resources,
and we refer to it as the HT lrtr,c game. As a consequence of the limited resources assumption, Λ can only
be a union of Cartesian products of pairs of type classes, i.e. if the pair of sequences (xn, tN ) belongs to
Λ, then any pair of sequences belonging to the Cartesian product T (Pxn)×T (PtN ) will also be contained
in Λ. Since a type class is univocally defined by the empirical pmf of the sequences contained in it, we
can redefine Λ as a union of pairs of types (P,Q) with P ∈ Pn and Q ∈ PN . In the following, we will
use the two interpretations of Λ (as a set of pairs of sequences or pairs of types) interchangeably, the
exact meaning being always recoverable from the context.
We are interested in studying the asymptotic behavior of the game when n and N tend to infinity. To
avoid the necessity of considering two limits with n and N tending to infinity independently, we will
express N as a function of n, and study what happens when n tends to infinity. This assumption does
not reduce the generality of our analysis, however it destroys the symmetry of the hypothesis testing
problem with respect to the two sequences xn and tN . The consequences of this loss of symmetry will
be discussed in Section V-A.
We are now ready to define the asymptotic HT lrtr,c game. Specifically, we have:
Definition 6. The HT lrtr,c(SD,SA, u) game is a zero-sum, strategic, game played by D and A, defined by
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the following strategies and payoff:
SD = {Λ ⊂ Pn × PN : (19)
max
PX∈C
PX{(x
n, tN(n)) /∈ Λ} ≤ 2−λn},
SA = {f(y
n, tN(n)) : d(yn, f(yn, tN(n))) ≤ nD}, (20)
u(Λ, f) = −Pfn = −
∑
tN(n)∈XN(n)
yn:(f(yn,tN(n)),tN(n))∈Λ
PY (y
n)PX(t
N(n)). (21)
Note that we ask that the false positive error probability decays exponentially fast with n, thus opening
the way to the asymptotic solution of the game. Similar definitions can be given for versions a and b of
the game.
V. ASYMPTOTIC EQUILIBRIUM OF THE HT lrtr,c GAME.
We start the analysis of the asymptotic equilibrium point of the HT lrtr,c game by determining the
optimum acceptance region for D. To do so we will use an analysis similar to that carried out in [21] to
study hypothesis testing with observed statistics. The main difference between our analysis and [21] is
the presence of the attacker, i.e. the game-theoretic nature of our problem. The derivation of the optimum
strategy for D passes through the definition of the generalized log-likelihood ratio function h(xn, tN ).
Given the test and training sequences xn and tN , the generalized log-likelihood ratio function is defined
as ([21], [30])5:
h(xn, tN ) = D(Pxn ||Prn+N ) +
N
n
D(PtN ||Prn+N ), (22)
where Prn+N indicates the empirical pmf of the sequence rn+N , obtained by concatenating xn and tN ,
i.e.
ri =

 xi i ≤ nti−n n < i ≤ n+N . (23)
Observing that h(xn, tN ) depends on the test and the training sequences only through their empirical
pmf, we can also use the notation h(Pxn , PtN ). The study of the equilibrium for the HT lrtr,c game passes
through the following lemmas.
5To simplify the notation, when it is not strictly necessary, we omit to indicate explicitly the dependence of N on n.
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Lemma 1. For any PX we have:
nD(Pxn||Prn+N )+ND(PtN ||Prn+N ) ≤ (24)
nD(Pxn||PX ) +ND(PtN ||PX ),
with equality holding if only if PX = Prn+N .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Let Λ∗tr,c be defined as follows:
Λ∗tr,c=
{
(Pxn , PtN ) : h(Pxn , PtN )<λ−|X |
log(n + 1)(N + 1)
n
}
(25)
with
lim
n→∞
log(N(n) + 1)
n
= 0. (26)
Then:
1) maxPX PX{(xn, tN ) /∈ Λ∗tr,c} ≤ 2−n(λ−νn), with νn → 0, for n→∞,
2) ∀Λ ∈ SD, we have Λc ⊆ Λ∗,ctr,c.
Proof: Being Λ∗tr,c a union of pairs of types (or, equivalently, a union of Cartesian products of type
classes), we have:
max
PX
Pfp = max
PX∈C
∑
(xn,tN )∈Λ∗,ctr,c
PX(x
n, tN ) (27)
= max
PX∈C
∑
(Pxn ,PtN )∈Λ
∗,c
tr,c
PX(T (Pxn)× T (PtN )).
For the class of discrete memoryless sources, the number of types with denominators n and N is bounded
by (n+ 1)|X | and (N + 1)|X | respectively [22], so we can write:
max
PX
Pfp ≤ max
PX
max
(Pxn ,PtN )∈Λ
∗,c
tr,c
(28)
[(n + 1)|X |(N + 1)|X |PX(T (Pxn)× T (PtN ))]
≤ (n+ 1)|X |(N + 1)|X |·
max
PX
max
(Pxn ,PtN )∈Λ
∗,c
tr,c
2−n[D(Pxn ||PX)+
N
n
D(PtN ||PX)],
where in the second inequality we have exploited the independence of xn and tN and the property of
types according to which for any sequence xn we have PX(T (Pxn)) ≤ 2−nD(Pxn ||PX) (see [22]). By
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exploiting Lemma 1, we can write:
max
PX
Pfp ≤ (n+ 1)
|X |(N + 1)|X | (29)
max
(Pxn ,PtN )∈Λ
∗,c
tr,c
2−n[D(Pxn ||Prn+N )+
N
n
D(PtN ||Prn+N )]
≤ (n+ 1)|X |(N + 1)|X | 2−n(λ−|X |
log(n+1)(N+1)
n
)
= 2−n(λ−2|X |
log(n+1)(N+1)
n
),
where the last inequality derives from the definition of Λ∗tr,c. Together with (26), equation (29) proves
the first part of the lemma with νn = 2|X | log(n+1)(N+1)n .
For any Λ ∈ SD, let (xn, tN ) be a generic pair of sequences contained in Λc, due to the limited
resources assumption the cartesian product between T (Pxn) and T (PtN ) will be entirely contained in Λc.
Then we have:
2−λn ≥ max
PX
PX(Λ
c) (30)
(a)
≥ max
PX
PX(T (Pxn)× T (PtN ))
(b)
≥ max
PX
2−n[D(Pxn ||PX)+
N
n
D(PtN ||PX)]
(n+ 1)|X |(N + 1)|X |
(c)
=
2−n[D(Pxn ||Prn+N )+
N
n
D(PtN ||Prn+N )]
(n+ 1)|X |(N + 1)|X |
,
where (a) is due to the limited resources assumption, (b) follows from the independence of xn and tN
and a lower bound on the probability of a pair of type classes [22], and (c) derives from Lemma 1. By
taking the logarithm of both sides we find that (xn, tN ) ∈ Λ∗,ctr,c, thus completing the proof.
The first part of Lemma 2 shows that, at least asymptotically, Λ∗tr,c belongs to SD, while the second part
implies the optimality of Λ∗tr,c. An important observation is that the optimum strategy of D is univocally
determined by the false positive constraint. This solves the apparent problem that we pointed out when
defining the payoff of the game, namely that the payoff depends on PX and PY and hence it is not
fully known to D. We also observe that Λ∗tr,c does not depend on tKA , hence it is the optimum defender’s
strategy even for versions a and b of the HT lrtr game. For this reason, from now on we will simply
indicate it as Λ∗tr.
The most important consequence of Lemma 2 is that the optimum strategy of D does not depend on
the strategy chosen by the attacker, that is Λ∗tr is a strictly dominant strategy for D. In turn this simplifies
the analysis of the optimum attacking strategy. In fact, a rationale defender will surely play the dominant
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strategy Λ∗tr , hence A can choose his strategy by assuming that D chooses Λ∗tr. The derivation of the
optimum attacking strategy is now an easy task. We only need to observe that the goal of A is to take a
sequence yn drawn from Y and modify it in such a way that:
h(zn, tN ) < λ− |X |
log(n + 1)(N + 1)
n
, (31)
with d(yn, zn) ≤ nD. The optimum attacking strategy, then, can be expressed as a minimization problem,
i.e.:
f∗tr,c(y
n, tN ) = arg min
zn:d(yn,zn)≤nD
h(zn, tN ). (32)
Note that to implement this strategy A needs to know tN , i.e. equation (32) determines the optimum
strategy only for version c of the game.
Having determined the optimum strategies for D and A, we can state the first main result of the paper,
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Asymptotic equilibrium of the HT lrtr,c game). The HT lrtr,c game is a dominance solvable
game and the profile (Λ∗tr, f∗tr,c) is the only rationalizable equilibrium.
Proof: Lemma 2 says that Λ∗tr is a strictly dominant strategy for D, thus permitting us to eliminate
all the other strategies in SD (since they are strictly dominated by Λ∗tr). The theorem, then, follows from
the optimality of f∗tr,c when Λ∗tr is fixed.
A. Discussion
As a first remark, we observe that (Λ∗tr, f∗tr,c) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. In addition
to the properties of Nash equilibria, however, (Λ∗tr, f∗tr,c) has the desirable characteristic of being the
only possible choice if the two players behave rationally. In fact, a rational defender will surely adopt
the acceptance region Λ∗tr , since any other choice will lead to a (asymptotically) higher Pfn, regardless
of the choice made by A. On his side, a rational attacker, knowing that D will behave rationally, will
adopt the strategy f∗tr,c, since this is the strategy that optimizes his payoff when D plays Λ∗tr (for more
details on the notion of rationalizable equilibrium we refer to [18], [19]).
To get a better insight into the meaning of the equilibrium point of the HT lrtr,c game, it is instructive to
compare it with the equilibrium of the corresponding game with known sources, namely the HT lrks game.
To start with, we observe that the use of the h function instead of the divergence D derives from the fact
that D must ensure that the false positive probability stays below the desired threshold for all possible
sources in C. To do so, he has to estimate the pmf that better explains the evidence provided by both xn
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and tN . This is exactly the role of Prn+N (see equation (A3)), with the generalized log-likelihood ratio
corresponding to 1 over n the log of the (asymptotic) probability that a source with pmf equal to Prn+N
outputs the sequences xn and tN .
Another observation regards the optimum strategy of the attacker. As a matter of fact, the functions
h(Pxn , PtN ) and D(Pxn ||PtN ) share a similar behavior: both are positive and convex functions achieving
the absolute minimum when Pxn = PtN , so one may be tempted to think that from A’s point of
view minimizing D(Pxn ||PtN ) is equivalent to minimizing h(Pxn , PtN ). While this is the case in some
situations, e.g. when the absolute minimum can be reached, in general the two minimization problems
yield different solutions.
To further compare the HT lrtr,c and the HT lrks games, it is useful to rewrite the generalized likelihood
function in a more convenient way. By applying some algebra, it is easy to prove the following equivalent
expression for h:
h(Pxn , PtN ) = D(Pxn ||PtN )−
N + n
n
D(Prn+N ||PtN ), (33)
showing that h(Pxn , PtN ) ≤ D(Pxn ||PtN ) with the equality holding only in the trivial case Pxn = PtN .
This suggests that, at least for large n, it should be easier for A to bring a sequence generated by Y
within Λ∗tr than to bring it within Λ∗ks. This is indeed the case, as it will be shown in Section VI-A,
where we will provide a rigorous proof that the HT lrtr,c game is actually more favorable to the attacker
than the HT lrks game.
We conclude this section by investigating the behavior of the optimal acceptance strategy for different
values of the ratio N
n
. To do so we introduce the two quantities cx = nn+N and ct =
N
n+N , representing
the weights of the sequences xn and tN in rn+N . It is easy to show, in fact, that
Prn+N = cxPxn + ctPtN . (34)
In the simplest case n and N will tend to infinity with the same speed, hence we can assume that the
ratio between N and n is fixed, namely, N
n
= c 6= 0 (we obviously have cx = 11+c and ct = c1+c ). Under
this assumption, the decision of D is dictated by equation (25) and no particular behavior can be noticed.
This is not the case when N/n tends to 0 or ∞.
If N/n → 0, then Prn+N → Pxn and h(Pxn , PtN ) → 0. This means that the defender will always
decide in favor of H0. This makes sense since when the test sequence is infinitely longer than the training
sequence, the evidence provided by the training sequence is not strong enough to let the defender reject
hypothesis 0.
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If N/n→∞, the analysis is slightly more involved. In this case ct → 1 and Prn+N → PtN , hence the
first term in equation (22) tends to D(Pxn ||PtN ). To understand the behavior of the second term of (22)
when n → ∞, we can use the Taylor expansion of D(P ||Q) when P approaches Q (see [23], chapter
4), which applied to the second term of the h function yields:
N
n
· D(PtN ||Prn+N ) ≈
N
2n
·
∑
x
(PtN (x)− Prn+N (x))
2
Prn+N (x)
=
N
2n
·
∑
x
(cxPtN (x) + cxPxn(x))
2
Prn+N (x)
=
n
N
2( n
N
+ 1)2
∑
x
(PtN (x) + Pxn(x))
2
Prn+N (x)
.
(35)
When N/n → ∞, the above expression clearly tends to 0, and hence h(Pxn , PtN ) → D(Pxn ||PtN ). In
other words, the optimum acceptance region tends to be equal to the one obtained for the case of know
sources with PX replaced by PtN . This is also an intuitively reasonable result: when the training sequence
is much longer than the test sequence, the empirical pmf of the training sequence provides such a reliable
estimate of PX that the defender can treat it as the true pmf.
One may wonder the reason behind the asymmetric behavior of the optimum decision strategy when
the length of one between the two sequences under analysis grows much faster than the other. This
apparent anomaly derives from the choice of analyzing the asymptotic behavior by letting n tend to
infinity, a choice that breaks the symmetry between the test and training sequences. If we had defined the
false positive and false negative error exponents in terms of N , the situation would have been completely
reversed.
In the following we will always assume that N/n = c, since from the above analysis this turns out to
be most interesting case.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE PAYOFF AT THE EQUILIBRIUM
Now that we have derived the equilibrium point of the HT lrtr,c game, we are ready to analyze the payoff
at the equilibrium to understand who, between the defender and the attacker is going to win the game.
Our aim is to derive a result similar to Theorem 2, so that given two pmf’s PX and PY , a false positive
error exponent λ and a distortion constraint D, we can derive the best achievable (for the defender)
false negative error exponent εtr,c. Specifically, we would like to know whether it is possible for D to
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obtain a strictly positive value of εtr,c, thus ensuring that the false negative error probability tends to zero
exponentially fast for increasing values of n.
In our proofs we will find it necessary to generalize the h function so that it can be applied to general
pmf’s not necessarily belonging to Pn or PN . By remembering that N/n = c, we introduce the following
definition:
hc(P,Q) = D(P ||U) + cD(Q||U), (36)
with
U =
1
1 + c
P +
c
1 + c
Q. (37)
Note that when P ∈ Pn and Q ∈ PN , the above definition is equivalent to (22). By using hc instead
of h we can generalize the expression of the optimum acceptance region Λ∗tr so to make it possible to
apply it to any pair of pmf’s P and Q (of course when P and Q are not empirical pmf’s the meaning
of Λ∗tr as acceptance region for H0 is lost):
Λ∗tr =
{
(P,Q) : hc(P,Q) < λ−|X |
log(n+ 1)(N + 1)
n
}
. (38)
With these ideas in mind, let us introduce the set Γntr,c containing all the pairs of sequences (yn, tN ), for
which A is able to bring yn within Λ∗,ntr (for sake of clarity we use the apex n to explicitly indicate that
Λ∗,ntr refers to pairs of sequences respectively of length n and N = cn):
Γntr,c = {(y
n, tN ) : ∃zn s.t.
(zn, tN ) ∈ Λ∗,ntr and d(yn, zn) ≤ nD}. (39)
By observing that Γntr,c depends on tN only through PtN and by reasoning as in the proof of Property
1 in [17] (we need to assume that the distance measure d is permutation-invariant), we can show that
Γntr,c is still a union of pairs of type classes, and hence we can redefine it as:
Γntr,c = {(Pyn , PtN ) : ∀y
n ∈ T (Pyn) ∃z
n s.t.
(Pzn , PtN ) ∈ Λ
∗,n
tr and d(yn, zn) ≤ nD}. (40)
Note that, by adopting the generalized version of Λ∗tr in which hc is used instead of h, the above definition
can also be applied when PtN is replaced by a generic pmf Q not necessarily belonging to PN . We will
also find it convenient to fix Q and consider the set of types Pxn for which (Pxn , Q) belongs to Λ∗,ntr
and Γntr,c, that is:
Λ∗,ntr (Q) = {Pxn : (Pxn , Q) ∈ Λ
∗,n
tr }, (41)
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Γntr,c(Q) = {Pyn : ∀y
n ∈ T (Pyn) ∃z
n s.t.
Pzn ∈ Λ
∗,n
tr (Q) and d(yn, zn) ≤ nD}. (42)
The derivation of the false negative error exponent at the equilibrium passes through the following
asymptotic extension of Γntr,c(Q):
Γ∞tr,c(Q) = cl
(⋃
n
Γntr,c(Q)
)
. (43)
The importance of the above definition is that for any source PX , given the false positive error exponent λ
and the maximum allowed per-letter distortion D, the set Γ∞tr,c(PX) corresponds to the indistinguishability
region of the HT lrtr,c game, i.e. the set of all the pmf’s for which D does not succeed in distinguishing
between H0 and H1 ensuring a false negative error probability that tends to zero exponentially fast. In
other words, if PY ∈ Γ∞tr,c(PX), no strictly positive false negative error exponent can be achieved by D.
To prove that this is indeed the case, we need to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Asymptotic payoff of the HT lrtr,c game). For the HT lrtr,c game, with N/n = c and assuming
an additive distortion measure, the false negative error exponent at the equilibrium is given by
εtr,c = min
Q
[c · D(Q||PX ) + min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(Q)
D(P ||PY )]. (44)
Proof: By using the definitions given in this section, the false negative error probability at the
equilibrium, for a given n, can be written:
Pfn =
∑
tN
PX(t
N )
∑
yn∈Γntr,c(PtN )
PY (y
n)
=
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))
∑
P∈Γntr,c(Q)
PY (T (P )). (45)
We start by deriving an upper-bound of the false negative error probability. By exploiting some well-
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known bounds on the probability of a type class and the number of types in Pn [22], we can write:
Pfn ≤
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))
∑
P∈Γntr,c(Q)
2−nD(P ||PY )
≤
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))(n + 1)
|X |2
−n min
P∈Γn
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )
≤
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))(n + 1)
|X |2
−n min
P∈Γ∞
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )
≤ (n+ 1)|X |(N + 1)|X |
·2
−n min
Q∈PN
[N
n
D(Q||PX)+ min
P∈Γ∞
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )]
≤ (n+ 1)|X |(N + 1)|X |
·2
−nmin
Q∈C
[cD(Q||PX)+ min
P∈Γ∞
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )]
, (46)
where the last inequality is obtained by minimizing over all Q without requiring that Q ∈ PN . By taking
the log and dividing by n we find:
−
logPfn
n
≥ min
Q∈C
[
cD(Q||PX) + min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(Q)
D(P ||PY )
]
+ αn, (47)
with αn = |X | log(n+1)(N+1)n tending to 0 when n tends to infinity.
We now turn to the analysis of a lower bound for Pfn. Let Q∗ be the pmf achieving the minimum
in (44). Due to the density of rational numbers within real numbers, we can find a sequence of pmf’s
Qn ∈ Pn that tends to Q∗ when n tends to infinity. By remembering that N = nc, the subsequence
QN = Qnc will also tend to Q∗ when n (and hence N ) tends to infinity6. Let us now consider the
6In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that c is a non-null integer value, the extension of the proof to non-integer
values of c is tedious but straightforward.
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following sequence of inequalities:
Pfn
(a)
≥
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))
∑
P∈Γntr,c(Q)
2−nD(P ||PY )
(n+ 1)|X |
(48)
≥
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))
2
−n min
P∈Γn
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )
(n+ 1)|X |
(b)
≥
∑
Q∈PN
2−ND(Q||PX)
(N + 1)|X |
2
−n min
P∈Γn
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )
(n+ 1)|X |
=
∑
Q∈PN
2
−n[cD(Q||PX)+ min
P∈Γn
tr,c
(Q)
D(P ||PY )]
(N + 1)|X |(n+ 1)|X |
(c)
≥
2
−n[cD(QN ||PX)+ min
P∈Γn
tr,c
(QN )
D(P ||PY )]
(N + 1)|X |(n + 1)|X |
,
where inequalities (a) and (b) derive from a known lower bounds on the probability of a type class [22],
and in (c) we have replaced the sum with a single element of the subsequence QN defined previously.
By taking the log and dividing by n, we obtain
−
log Pfn
n
≤ cD(QN ||PX) + min
P∈Γntr,c(QN )
D(P ||PY ) + βn, (49)
where βn = |X | log(n+1)(N+1)n tends to 0 when n tends to infinity. To continue, let P
∗ be defined as
follows
P ∗ = arg min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(Q∗)
D(P ||PY ). (50)
In Appendix B, we show that it is possible to find a sequence Pn, where each Pn belongs to Γntr,c(QN ),
that tends to P ∗ when n tends to infinity. By starting from equation (49) and by exploiting the continuity
of the divergence function, for n large enough we can write
−
logPfn
n
≤ cD(Q∗||PX) + β
′
n +D(Pn||PY ) + βn, (51)
≤ cD(Q∗||PX) + β
′
n +D(P
∗||PY ) + β
′′
n + βn,
where all the sequences βn, β′n and β′′n tend to zero when n tends to infinity.
By coupling equations (47) and (51) and by letting n→∞, we eventually obtain:
− lim
n→∞
log Pfn
n
= min
Q
[c · D(Q||PX) + min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(Q)
D(P ||PY )], (52)
thus proving the theorem.
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According to Theorem 4, we can distinguish two cases depending on the relationship between PX and
PY .
1) PY ∈ Γ∞tr,c(PX) then εtr,c = 0;
2) PY /∈ Γ∞tr,c(PX) then εtr,c > 0.
In the former case, which is obtained by letting Q∗ = PX , it is not possible for D to obtain a strictly
positive false negative error exponent while ensuring that the false positive error exponent is at least equal
to λ. In the latter case, it is not possible that the two divergences in (44) are simultaneously equal to zero,
hence Pfn tends to 0 exponentially fast. In other words, given λ and D, the condition PY /∈ Γ∞tr,c(PX)
ensures that the distance between PY and PX is large enough to allow a reliable distinction between
sequences drawn from PX and sequences drawn from PY despite the presence of the adversary. As
anticipated, then, Γ∞tr,c(PX) is the indistinguishability region of the HT lrtr,c game.
A. Comparison between the HT lrks and HT lrtr,c games
In this section we compare the asymptotic performance achievable by D for the HT lrks and HT lrtr,c
games. We start the analysis by comparing the indistinguishability regions of the two games, namely
Γ∞ks(PX) and Γ∞tr,c(PX) (where, as opposed to Section III, we now explicitly indicate the dependence of
Γ∞ks on PX ).
The comparison between the two regions relies on the comparison between the divergence and the
generalized likelihood function. In particular, the starting point of our analysis is the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Relationship between hc and D). Let N/n = c, with c 6= 0, c 6= ∞, for any P 6= PX we
have,
hc(P,PX ) < D(P ||PX). (53)
Proof: By rewriting hc(P,PX) as in equation (33), we have:
hc(P,PX ) = D(P ||PX)− (1 + c)D(U ||PX ) (54)
with U = P/(1 + c) + cPX/(1 + c), which is equal to PX if and only if P = PX , when we have
D(U ||PX) = 0 thus yielding hc(P,PX) = D(P ||PX) = 0.
In the subsequent proofs we will refer to the way the mapping function f operates on yn to produce
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zn7. Specifically, we will indicate with nf (i→ j) the number of times that f transforms the i-th symbol
of X into the j-th one. The main result of our analysis is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (HT lrtr,c vs HT lrks). For any finite, non-null value of c, any PX , λ > 0 and D we have
Γ∞ks(PX) ⊂ Γ
∞
tr,c(PX). (55)
Proof: We will prove the theorem by first showing that Γ∞ks(PX ) ⊆ Γ∞tr,c(PX), and then finding at
least one point (actually an infinite set of points) that belongs to Γ∞tr,c(PX ) but does not stay in Γ∞ks(PX).
Let yn be a sequence such that Pyn ∈ Γnks(PX), this means that a mapping fn exists that transforms
yn into a sequence zn belonging to Λ∗,nks (PX), while satisfying the distortion constraint. Let now m be
a multiple of n (m = kn). For k large enough we have
λ− |X |
log(n+ 1)
n
< λ− |X |
log(m+ 1)(cm+ 1)
m
. (56)
Since Pzn ∈ Λ∗,nks (PX), Lemma 3 permits us to write:
hc(Pzn , PX) ≤ D(Pzn ||PX) (57)
< λ− |X |
log(n+ 1)
n
< λ− |X |
log(m+ 1)(cm+ 1)
m
.
Given that m is a multiple of n, any P ∈ Pn also belongs to Pm, permitting us to conclude that
Pzn ∈ Λ
∗,m
tr (PX). Let now ym be an m-long sequence having the same type of yn (this is surely possible
since m is a multiple of n). If we apply to ym a mapping function vm for which nvm(i→ j) = knfn(i→
j), the sequence zm = vm(ym) will have the same type of zn, and hence by virtue of equation (57)
Pzm ∈ Λ
∗,m
tr (PX). In addition, the mapping vm introduces the same per-letter distortion of fn for any
additive distortion measure, permitting us to conclude that Pym ∈ Γmtr,c(PX). In summary, we have shown
that for any P ∈ Γnks(PX) an m = kn exists such that P ∈ Γmtr,c(PX), and hence:
Γ∞ks(PX) = cl
(⋃
n
Γnks(PX)
)
(58)
⊆ cl
(⋃
m
Γmtr,c(PX)
)
= Γ∞tr,c(PX ).
7To keep the notation as light as possible we will not distinguish between mapping functions used for the known source case
and those applying to hypothesis testing with training sequences, even if, rigorously speaking, these are quite different functions
since the latter also depend on the training sequence tN .
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We now prove that there is at least one point that belongs to Γ∞tr,c(PX) but does not belong to Γ∞ks(PX)
(actually there is an infinite number of such points). To do so let us consider a point P ∗ belonging to
the boundary of Γ∞tr,c(PX). Since by definition Γ∞tr,c(PX) is a closed set, P ∗ will also belong to it. Due
to Lemma 4 (Appendix B), we can find a sequence of types P in ∈ Γntr,c(PX ) that tends to P ∗ from the
inside of Γ∞tr,c(PX). On the other hand, since P ∗ lies on the boundary of the closed set Γ∞tr,c(PX), any
ball centered in P ∗ will contain an infinite number of points that do not belong to Γ∞tr,c(PX). Due to
the density of rational numbers in real numbers, it is possible to define an outer sequence of types P on
tending to P ∗, for which P on ∈ Pn and for which no mapping function exists that when applied to the
sequences in the type class of P on moves them into Λ
∗,n
tr (PX) with a per-letter distortion equal or lower
than D. In other words, for any sequence yn ∈ P on and any (distortion-limited) mapping f(yn) = wn we
have
hc(Pwn , PX ) ≥ λ− |X |
log(n + 1)(cn + 1)
n
. (59)
Let fn be the sequence of optimum mapping functions that applied to the sequences in T (P in) results in
a sequence zn for which hc(Pzn , PX) < λ− |X |[log(n + 1)(cn + 1)]/n.
Given that Pzn is obtained by transforming sequences belonging to a sequence of types tending to the
limit type P ∗, by continuity we can say that the sequence of types Pzn will also converge to a type, say
P ∗z . Let us assume now that P ∗z 6= PX 8. Of course we also have Pzn 6= PX (at least for large n). Then,
by Lemma 3, and due to the continuity of the hc function, we have
D(Pzn ||PX)− hc(Pzn , PX) = τn,
D(P ∗z ||PX)− hc(P
∗
z , PX) = τ,
lim
n→∞
τn = τ, (60)
where τ is strictly larger than 0.
Let us now consider the outer sequence P on . Since both P in and P on tend to P ∗, for n large enough, P in
and P on will become arbitrarily close. By continuity, if we apply the same9 fn to a sequence in T (P on),
8It is always possible to find a point P ∗ for which this is true, unless the optimal acceptance region asymptotically reduces
to the single point PX . This would be the case if we let λ→ 0, a situation that is not considered in the present analysis.
9Rigorously speaking it is possible that fn can not be applied as is to the sequences in T (P on), since we have to ensure
that, for each i, nfn(i → j) is not larger than the number of symbols i in the to-be-mapped sequence. However, given the
closeness of the sequences in P in and P on the modifications we need to introduce within fn are minor and our arguments still
work. Readers may refer to Appendix A in [17] for a detailed proof of how the closeness of types can be exploited to ensure
that the types of the remapped sequences are also close to each other.
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we will obtain a sequence wn whose type is arbitrarily close to Pzn , let us indicate it by Pwn (we can also
say that Pwn → P ∗z ). Due to the continuity of the hc function, hc(Pzn , PX) and hc(Pwn , PX) will also be
arbitrarily close; hc(Pwn , PX), though, will be larger than or equal to λ−|X |(log(n+1)(cn+1))/n, since
wn has been obtained by starting from a point belonging to P on . This, in turn, means that hc(Pzn , PX)
will be arbitrarily close to λ− |X |(log(n+ 1)(cn + 1))/n (though lower than that). In other words, for
any δ > 0, when n is large enough, we have∣∣∣∣
(
λ− |X |
log(n+ 1)(cn + 1)
n
)
− hc(Pzn , PX)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ. (61)
If n is large enough, then, for all the sequences in T (P in) we have:
D(Pzn ||PX ) = hc(Pzn , PX) + τn (62)
≥ λ− |X |
log(n+ 1)(cn + 1)
n
− δ + τn
> λ,
where for the last inequality we have exploited the fact that for large n, δ can be made arbitrarily small,
log(n)/n tends to 0 and τn tends to τ > 0. As a result, for large n, P in /∈ Γmks(PX), for any m and hence:
P in /∈
⋃
n
Γnks(PX). (63)
On the other hand, P in can not belong to the closure of ∪nΓnks(PX ) (and hence to Γ∞ks(PX)), since in
this case we could find a new sequence of types arbitrarily close to P in which could be moved within
Λ∗,nks . By continuity, then, P in could also be moved within Λ
∗,n
ks for some n thus contradicting (62). It
goes without saying that, a fortiori, no point P ∗ on the boundary of Γ∞tr,c(PX) belongs to Γ∞ks(PX).
Theorem 5 has two simple corollaries.
Corollary 1. For any pmf P belonging to the boundary of Γ∞ks(PX) there exists a positive value ε
such that B(P, ε) ⊂ Γ∞tr,c(PX), where B(P, ε) is a ball centered in P with radius ε. In the same
way, for any pmf P belonging to the boundary of Γ∞tr,c(PX) there exists a positive value ε such that
B(P, ε) ∩ Γ∞ks(PX) = ∅.
Proof: It follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 5.
Corollary 2. Let εks and εtr,c denote the error exponents at the equilibrium for the HT lrks and HT lrtr,c
games. Then we have:
εtr,c ≤ εks, (64)
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where the equality holds if and only if PY ∈ Γ∞ks(PX), when both error exponents are equal to 0.
Proof: The corollary is obvious when PY ∈ Γ∞tr,c(PX), since in this case εtr,c = 0 and εks = 0 if
PY ∈ Γ
∞
ks(PX) and nonzero otherwise. If PY /∈ Γ∞tr,c(PX), by considering the expression of the error
exponent for the HT lrtr,c game we have:
εtr,c = min
Q∈P
[c · D(Q||PX) + min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(Q)
D(P ||PY )] (65)
≤ cD(PX ||PX) + min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(PX)
D(P ||PY )
(a)
= min
P∈Γ∞tr,c(PX)
D(P ||PY )
< min
P∈Γ∞ks(PX)
D(P ||PY ) = εks.
where the last strict inequality is justified by observing that the absolute minimum of D(P ||PY ) is
obtained for P = PY which lies outside Γ∞tr,c(PX), hence due to the convexity of D and Corollary 1,
the value P satisfying the minimization on the left-hand side of equality (a) belongs to the non-empty
set {Γ∞tr,c(PX)/Γ
∞
ks(PX)}.
Theorem 5 and Corollary 2 permit us so to conclude that hypothesis testing with training data is more
favorable to the attacker than hypothesis testing with known sources. The reason behind such a result is
the use of the h function instead of the divergence, which in turns stems from the need for the defender
to ensure that the constraint on the false positive error probability is satisfied for all PX ∈ C. It is such
a worse case assumption that ultimately favors the attacker in the HT lrtr,c game.
VII. BINARY HYPOTHESIS TESTING GAME WITH INDEPENDENT TRAINING SEQUENCES (HT lrtr,a).
We now pass to the analysis of version a of the HT lrtr game. We remind that in this case D and A
rely on independent training sequences, namely tND and tKA . As for version c, we assume that both N
and K grow linearly with n and that the asymptotic analysis is carried out by letting n go to infinity.
Specifically, we assume that N = cn and K = dn. As we already noted in Section V, the strategy Λ∗tr
identified by Lemma 2 is optimum regardless of the relationship between tND and tKA , hence the only
difference between versions a and c of the game is in the strategy of the attacker. In fact, now the attacker
does not have a perfect knowledge of the acceptance region adopted by the defender, since such a region
depends on the empirical pmf of tND which A does not know.
A reasonable strategy for the attacker could be to use the empirical pmf of tKA instead of the one
derived from tNA . More precisely, by using the notation introduced in Section VI (equation (41)), the
attacker could try to move yn into Λ∗,ntr (PtKA ), while the acceptance region adopted by the defender is
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Λ∗,ntr (PtND ). Given that t
N
D and tKA are generated by the same source, their empirical pmf’s will both tend
to PX when n goes to infinity, and hence using Λ∗,ntr (PtKA ) should be in some way equivalent to using
Λ∗,ntr (PtND ). In fact, in the following we will show that, given PX , D and λ, the indistinguishability region
for version a of the game, let us call it Γ∞tr,a(PX), is identical to the indistinguishability region of version
c. Of course, this does not mean that the achievable payoff for the HT lrtr,a game is equal to that of the
HT lrtr,c game, since, even if the indistinguishability region is the same, outside it the false negative error
exponent for case a may be different (actually larger) than that of case c.
We start our analysis by assuming that c = d (and hence N = K), i.e. the training sequences available
to the defender and the attacker have the same length. Our goal is to investigate the asymptotic behavior
of the payoff of the HT lrtr,a game for the profile (Λ
∗,n
tr (PtND ), f˜), where the, not necessarily optimum,
strategy f˜ adopted by the attacker is defined as:
f˜(yn, tNA ) = arg min
zn:d(zn,yn)≤nD
h(Pzn , PtNA ). (66)
We also impose the additional constraint that for any permutation σ we have:
f˜(σ(yn), tNA ) = σ(f˜(y
n, tNA )). (67)
By following the same flow of ideas used in Section VI, we consider the set of sequences for which the
attacker is able to move yn within the acceptance region Λ∗,ntr (PtND ), i.e.:
Γ˜ntr,a = {(y
n, tND , t
N
A ) : f˜(y
n, tNA ) ∈ Λ
∗,n
tr (PtND )}. (68)
Thanks to the additional constraint in equation (67), and by reasoning as in the proof of Property 1 in
[17], it is easy to show that Γ˜ntr,a is a union of triple of type classes10, hence permitting us to redefine
Γ˜ntr,a in terms of types. Similarly to version c of the game, we find it useful to introduce the following
definition:
Γ˜ntr,a(PtND , PtNA ) ={Pyn ∈ Pn : (69)
∀yn ∈ T (Pyn), (f˜(y
n, tNA ), t
N
D) ∈ Λ
∗,n
tr }.
10The necessity of imposing that f˜ commutes with permutations comes out when for a certain yn the minimization in (66)
has several solutions {zn(1) . . . zn(k)}, some of which, say the first m, fall within Λ∗,ntr (PtN
D
) while the others don’t. If we
consider σ(yn) instead of yn, {σ(zn(1)) . . . σ(zn(k))} will still be solutions of the minimization problem. In addition, the first
m sequences will still belong to Λ∗,ntr (PtN
D
), while the others will not. If we want that Γ˜ntr,a is a union of triple of type classes,
it is necessary to require that when yn is permuted f˜ continues to pick up a minimizer inside (or outside) Λ∗,ntr (PtN
D
). This is
surely the case if f˜(σ(yn), tNA ) = σ(f˜(yn, tNA )).
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By using the generalized function hc instead of h, we can apply the above definition to any pair of pmf’s.
Specifically, given two pmf’s Q and R, we define:
Γ˜ntr,a(Q,R) = {Pyn ∈ Pn : (70)
∀yn ∈ T (Pyn), (f˜ (y
n, R), Q) ∈ Λ∗,ntr .
It is easy to see that:
Γ˜ntr,a(Q,R) ⊆ Γ˜
n
tr,a(Q,Q) (71)
Γ˜ntr,a(Q,Q) = Γ
n
tr,c(Q),
since when (and only when) Q = R A performs its attack by using exactly the same acceptance region
adopted by D, while in all the other cases he can rely only on an estimate based on its own training
sequence. Paralleling the analysis of the HT lrtr,c game, we introduce the set
Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,R) = cl
(⋃
n
Γ˜ntr,a(Q,R)
)
(72)
for which, thanks to (71), we have Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,R) ⊆ Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q) = Γ∞tr,c(Q).
We are now ready to prove our main result regarding the HT lrtr,a game.
Theorem 6 (Asymptotic payoff of the HT lrtr,a game). The error exponent of the payoff associated to the
profile (Λ∗,ntr (PtND ), f˜(·, tNA )) is lower (upper) bounded as follows
ε˜tr,a ≥ min
Q,R∈C
{
c[D(Q||PX) +D(R||PX)] (73)
+ min
P∈Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,R)
D(P ||PY ))
}
,
ε˜tr,a ≤ min
Q∈C
[
2c · D(Q||PX) + min
P∈Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q)
D(P ||PY )
]
. (74)
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4, with the noticeable difference that now
the lower and upper bounds are different hence preventing us to derive a precise expression for the
error exponent. Let us start with the lower bound. By recalling the definition of the false negative error
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probability, for any n we can write:
Pfn =
∑
tND
∑
tNA
PX(t
N
D)PX(t
N
A )
∑
P∈Γ˜ntr,a(PtN
D
,P
tN
A
)
PY (T (P ))
=
∑
Q∈PN
∑
R∈PN
PX(T (Q))PX (T (R))
∑
P∈Γ˜ntr,a(Q,R)
PY (T (P ))
≤
∑
Q∈PN
∑
R∈PN
PX(T (Q))PX (T (R))
· (n+ 1)|X |2
−n min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,R)
D(P ||PY )
≤
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))(n + 1)
|X |(N + 1)|X |
· 2
−n min
R∈PN
[cD(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,R)
D(P ||PY )]
≤ (n + 1)|X |(N + 1)2|X |
· 2
−n min
Q,R∈C
[cD(Q||PX)+cD(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,R)
D(P ||PY ))]
, (75)
where in the last inequality we replaced the minimization over all Q and R in PN , with a minimization
over the entire space of pmf’s. By taking the logarithm of both sides and by letting n tend to infinity,
the lower bound in equation (73) is proved.
We now turn the attention to the upper bound. To do so, let Q∗ be the pmf achieving the minimum in
equation (74). Due to the density of rational numbers within real numbers, we can find two sequences
of pmf’s Qn and Rn that tend to Q∗ when n tends to infinity, and such that Qn ∈ Pn, Rn ∈ Pn,∀n.
By remembering that N = nc, we can say that the subsequences QN = Qnc and RN = Rnc also tend
to Q∗ when n (and hence N ) tends to infinity. We can, then, use the subsequences QN and RN to write
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the following chain of inequalities:
Pfn =
∑
Q∈PN
∑
R∈PN
PX(T (Q))PX (T (R))
∑
P∈Γ˜ntr,a(Q,R)
PY (T (P ))
≥
∑
Q∈PN
∑
R∈PN
PX(T (Q))PX (T (R))
∑
P∈Γ˜ntr,a(Q,R)
2−nD(P ||PY )
(n+ 1)|X |
(a)
≥
∑
Q∈PN
∑
R∈PN
PX(T (Q))PX (T (R))
2
−n min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,R)
D(P ||PY )
(n+ 1)|X |
≥
∑
Q∈PN
∑
R∈PN
PX(T (Q))
2
−n[cD(R||PX)+ min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,R)
D(P ||PY )]
(N + 1)|X |(n+ 1)|X |
(b)
≥
∑
Q∈PN
PX(T (Q))
2
−n[cD(RN ||PX)+ min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,RN )
D(P ||PY )]
(N + 1)|X |(n+ 1)|X |
≥
∑
Q∈PN
2
−n[cD(Q||PX)+cD(RN ||PX)+ min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(Q,RN )
D(P ||PY )]
(N + 1)2|X |(n+ 1)|X |
(c)
≥
2
−n[cD(QN ||PX)+cD(RN ||PX)+ min
P∈Γ˜n
tr,a
(QN,RN )
D(P ||PY )]
(N + 1)2|X |(n+ 1)|X |
, (76)
where inequalities (a), (b) and (c) have been obtained by replacing the summation with a single element
of the sum (two elements of the sequences QN and RN for (b) and (c)), and the others rely on a known
lower bound on the probability of a type class ([22], chapter 12). By taking the logarithm of each side
in (76), we can write:
ε˜tr,a ≤ cD(QN ||PX ) + cD(RN ||PX)
+ min
P∈Γ˜ntr,a(QN ,RN )
D(P ||PY ) + βn, (77)
with βn = [2|X | log(N + 1) + |X | log(n + 1)]/n tending to 0 for n→∞. Let then P ∗ be defined as:
P ∗ = arg min
P∈Γ˜∞tr,a(Q∗,Q∗)
D(P ||PY ). (78)
By recalling that both QN and RN tend to Q∗ for increasing N , we can invoke Lemma 5 in Appendix
C, to build a sequence Pn such that each term of the sequence belongs to Γ˜ntr,a(QN , RN ) and Pn → P ∗,
when n→∞. By recalling that
Q∗ = argmin
Q∈C
[
2c · D(Q||PX) + min
P∈Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q)
D(P ||PY )
]
, (79)
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and by reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4 (equations (51) and (52) and discussion therein), we can
eventually prove the upper bound (74).
Theorem 6 has an important corollary.
Corollary 3 (Indistinguishability region for HT lrtr,a). The false negative error exponent associated to the
profile (Λ∗,ntr (PtND ), f˜(·, tNA )) is equal to zero if and only if PY ∈ Γ˜∞tr,a(PX , PX) = Γ∞tr,c(PX ), and hence
the indistinguishability region of the HT lrtr,a game is equal to that of the HT lrtr,c game.
Proof: From the upper bound in Theorem 6, it follows that ε˜tr,a = 0 if PY ∈ Γ˜∞tr,a(PX , PX), whereas
from the lower bound we see that ε˜tr,a = 0 implies that PY ∈ Γ˜∞tr,a(PX , PX).
Corollary 3 provides an interesting insight into the achievable performance of the HT lrtr,a game. While,
in general, version a of the game is less favorable to the attacker than version c, since in the latter case the
attacker knows exactly the acceptance region adopted by the defender, if the attacker adopts the strategy
f˜ , the indistinguishability regions of the two games are the same. Such a strategy, then, is optimal at
least as far as the indistinguishability region is concerned. On the other side, there is no guarantee that
the attacker can achieve the same payoff as for version c.
A. Training sequences with different length
We conclude this section by discussing briefly the case in which the training sequences tND and tKA
have different lengths, i.e. c 6= d. To simplify the analysis we assume that c is known to the attacker, in
this way A knows at least the exact form the hc function used by D. We focus on the following attacking
strategy: use the training sequence tKA to estimate PtND and use the estimate to attack the sequence y
n
.
Specifically, the attacker may use the following estimate of PtND :
P˜tND (i) =
1
N
⌊
PtKA (i) ·N
⌋
∀i = 1 . . . |X | − 1,
P˜tND (|X |) = 1−
|X |−1∑
i=1
P˜tND (i), (80)
to implement the attacking function:
f˜(yn, tKA ) = arg min
zn:d(zn,yn)≤nD
hc(Pzn , P˜tND ). (81)
With the above definitions, we can easily extend the analysis carried out for the case c = d and obtain
very similar results. Specifically, the upper bound in Theorem 6 can be rewritten as:
ε˜tr,a ≤ min
Q∈C
[
(c+ d) · D(Q||PX) + min
P∈Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q)
D(P ||PY )
]
, (82)
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whose proof is practically identical to the proof of Theorem 6 and is omitted for sake of brevity. By
observing that the performance achievable by the defender in version a of the game are at least as good
as those achievable in version c, since in the latter case A knows exactly the acceptance region adopted
by D and hence his attacks will surely be more effective, equation (82) allows us to conclude that the
indistinguishability region is equal to that obtained for the case c = d.
We end this section by considering briefly version b of the game. In some sense, we can say that
version b is halfway between versions a and c. Like in version a, the attacker does not have a perfect
knowledge of the training sequence used by the defender and hence he must resort to an estimate of the
true acceptance region. On the other hand, the situation is more favorable to the attacker with respect
to version a with d < c, since now D knows at least part of the training samples used by D. Given
that versions a and c of the game have the same indistinguishability region, we can conclude that the
indistinguishability region of version b will also be the same.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The need to protect the cyberworld that surrounds us has spurred researchers to look for suitable
countermeasures against the ever increasing number of attacks that every day are brought against the
digital world we live in. In many cases, though, research has focused on specific security threats, each
time by developing tailored solutions that can not be easily extended to other scenarios. It is no surprise,
then, that similar solutions are re-invented several times, and that the same problems are faced with again
and again by ignoring that satisfactory solutions have already been discovered in contiguous fields. Even
worse, the lack of a unifying view does not permit to grasp the essence of the addressed problems and
work out effective and general solutions to be applied with limited effort to different fields. Times are
ripe to develop general tools and models that can be used to analyze very general classes of problems
wherein the presence of an adversary aiming at system failure can not be neglected.
As a first attempt in this sense, we have introduced a framework to analyze the achievable performance
of binary hypothesis testing in an adversarial setting, i.e. when an adversary is present with the explicit
goal of degrading the performance of the test. We did so by casting the hypothesis testing problem into
a game-theoretic framework. In this way, in fact, we have been able to define rigorously the goals and
constraints of the two contenders, namely the analyst, a.k.a. the defender, and the adversary or attacker.
More specifically we introduced several versions of the hypothesis testing game, by paying attention
to distinguish between hypothesis testing with known sources and hypothesis testing with training data.
Given that a problem very similar the former case has already been studied in [17], we then focused on
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hypothesis testing with training data (the HTtr game). From a more technical point of view, we derived
the asymptotic equilibrium point of various versions of the game, and analyzed the achievable payoff at
the equilibrium. In addition to shedding a new light on the achievable performance of hypothesis testing
in an adversarial environment, the analysis we carried out has the merit to clearly show the potentiality
of the use of game-theoretic concepts coupled with tools typical of information theory and statistics.
Several directions for future research can be pointed out. The extension of our analysis to multiple
hypothesis testing and classification is one of the most promising research directions, together with the
extension to games characterized by more than two players. The analysis of situations in which the
players do not have a perfect knowledge of the strategies available to the other players, or even the
payoff function, by modeling the problem as a game with imperfect knowledge is another interesting
research direction. The investigation of sequential games, in which the players move repeatedly each
time by exploiting the result of the previous round of the game also offers many interesting hints for a
fruitful research.
From a more focused perspective, it would be interesting to study specific instances of the HTtr game,
in which the sources belong to a specific class, e.g. binary sources. We predict that in this way simpler
expressions of the equilibrium point, the achievable payoff and, most of all, the indistinguishability
region could be obtained, thus permitting to get additional interesting insights. Finally, we mention the
opportunity of extending the analysis to the case of continuous sources. While the general ideas would
remain the same, passing from discrete to continuous sources does not seem to be a trivial step, since
our analysis relied heavily on the method of types, whose extension to continuous sources, though not
impossible, comes with a number of additional difficulties.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We start by remembering that for memoryless sources we have ([22], chapter 12):
nD(Pxn ||PX) = − log(PX(x
n))− nH(Pxn). (A1)
By applying the above property to the right-hand side of equation (24), we obtain:
nD(Pxn ||PX) +ND(PtN ||PX) = (A2)
− nH(Pxn)−NH(PtN )− logPX(r
n+N ),
where we have used the memoryless nature of PX due to which PX(rn+N) = PX(tN ) · PX(xn). For
any PX ∈ C, we also have11:
PX(r
n+N ) ≤
∏
a∈X
Prn+N (a)
Nrn+N (a), (A3)
where Nrn+N (a) indicates the number of times that symbol a appears in rn+N , and where equality holds
if and only if PX(a) = Prn+N (a) for all a. By applying the log function we have:
log PX(r
n+N ) ≤ log
∏
a∈X
Prn+N (a)
Nrn+N (a) (A4)
= log
∏
a∈X
Prn+N (a)
(Nxn (a)+NtN (a))
=
∑
a∈X
Nxn(a) log Prn+N (a)+
∑
a∈X
NtN (a) log Prn+N (a).
11Relationship (A3) can be proved, for instance, by exploiting the inequality lnx ≥ (1− 1/x) (where the equality holds if
and only if x = 1).
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By inserting the above inequality in (A2), and by using the definition of empirical KL divergence, we
obtain:
nD(Pxn ||PX) +ND(PtN ||PX) (A5)
≥
∑
a∈X
Nxn(a) log
Pxn(a)
Prn+N (a)
+
∑
a∈X
NtN (a) log
PtN (a)
Prn+N (a)
= nD(Pxn||Prn+N ) +ND(PtN ||Prn+N ),
where the equality holds if and only if PX = Prn+N , thus completing the proof.
B. Topology of Γ∞tr,c(Q)
Many of the proofs in the body of the paper relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let {QN(n)} be a sequence of pmf’s such that QN(n) → Q when n→∞. Then, for any pmf
P ∗ in Γ∞tr,c(Q) a sequence Pn exists such that Pn ∈ Γntr,c(QN(n)) for each n and Pn → P ∗.
Proof: To prove the lemma, we will show that for any ε > 0 and n large enough, we can find a
pmf Pn ∈ Γntr,c(QN(n)) such that d(Pn, P ∗) < ε. Specifically, we will do so by assuming that P ∗ ∈
∪nΓ
n
tr,c(Q). If this is not the case, in fact, by the definition of Γ∞tr,c(Q), it is possible to find a pmf
P ′ ∈ ∪nΓ
n
tr,c(Q) that is arbitrarily close to P ∗, and then a pmf in Γntr,c(QN(n)) that is arbitrarily close
to P ′ and hence to P ∗. Let then P ∗ belong to Γmtr,c(Q) for some m. This means that for any sequence
ym ∈ T (P ∗) a mapping f exists that transforms ym into a sequence zm such that
hc(Pzm , Q) = λ− δm − δ (A6)
with δm = |X |[log(m+1)(N(m) + 1)]/m and where δ is a strictly positive quantity. Due to the density
of ∪nPn in set of all pmf’s, we can find a sequence of pmf’s Pn that tends to P ∗ when n tends to infinity
and for which Pn ∈ Pn for each n. Let yn be a sequence in T (Pn). Let nf (i→ j) indicate the number
of times that the mapping f transforms the i-th symbol of the alphabet into the j-th one. By starting
from the mapping f , for each n we build a mapping v(n) for which nv(n)(i→ j) = ⌊nf (i→ j) · n/m⌋.
When n increases the type of zn = v(n)(yn) will approach that of zm = f(ym) for any ym in P ∗.
By remembering that QN(n) → Q when n tends to infinity, and by exploiting the continuity of the h
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function, we can write:
hc(Pzn , QN(n)) = hc(Pzn , Q) + β
′
n (A7)
= hc(Pzm , Q) + β
′
n + β
′′
n
= λ− δm − δ + β
′
n + β
′′
n,
where β′n and β′′n tend to zero when n → ∞. Given that δ is a fixed and strictly positive number, we
conclude that when n is large, Pzn belongs to Λntr(QN(n)) and hence Pn belongs to Γntr,c(QN(n)), thus
completing the proof.
C. Topology of Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q)
The analysis of version a of the hypothesis testing game needs that lemma 4 is generalized as follows.
Lemma 5. Let {QN(n)} and {RN(n)} be two sequences of pmf’s such that QN(n) → Q and RN(n) → Q
as n→∞. Then, for any pmf P ∗ in Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q) a sequence Pn ∈ Γ˜ntr,a(QN(n), RN(n)) exists such that
Pn → P
∗
.
Proof: Given the definition of Γ˜∞tr,a(Q,Q) as the closure of
⋃
n Γ˜
n
tr,a(Q,Q), we proceed as in Lemma
4, and limit our proof to the special case in which P ∗ ∈
⋃
n Γ˜
n
tr,a(Q,Q). Let then P ∗ belong to Γ˜mtr,a(Q,Q)
for some m. This means that for any sequence ym ∈ T (P ∗) the function
f˜(ym, Q) = arg min
zm:d(zm,ym)≤mD
hc(Pzm , Q) (A8)
maps ym into a sequence zm such that
hc(Pzm , Q) = λ− δm − δ, (A9)
with δm = |X |[log(m+1)(N(m) + 1)]/m and where δ is a strictly positive quantity. Due to the density
of rational numbers in the real line, we can find a sequence of pmf’s Pn that tends to P ∗ when n tends to
infinity and for which Pn ∈ Pn for each n. Let un be a sequence in T (Pn). By reasoning as in Lemma
4, we can define a, distortion-limited, mapping v for which nv(i → j) = ⌊nf˜ (i → j) · n/m⌋. As we
have shown in Lemma 4, when n is large, v brings the sequence un into a sequence wn ∈ Λ∗,ntr , so that,
for any QN(n) → Q and n large enough, we have:
hc(Pwn , QN(n)) = λ− δm − δ + β
′
n, (A10)
with β′n approaching zero when n increases. This, however, is not enough to ensure that Pn ∈ Γ˜ntr,a(QN(n), RN(n)),
since for this to be the case the minimization (A8) has to be carried by using RN(n) instead of QN(n),
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and so there is no guarantee that the optimum mapping function will be v (or another mapping better than
that). Despite this observation, we can exploit the fact that RN(n) tends to Q when n tends to infinity, to
show that indeed, for large n, Pn ∈ Γ˜ntr,a(QN (n), RN(n)). Given un ∈ Pn, let rn be defined as follows:
rn = arg min
rn:d(rn,un)≤nD
hc(Prn , RN(n)). (A11)
Since both QN(n) and RN(n) tend to Q, when n increases they will get arbitrarily close to each other.
By exploiting the continuity of the hc function, we can write the following chain of inequalities:
hc(Prn , QN(n))
(a)
≤ hc(Prn , RN(n)) + β
′′
n (A12)
(b)
≤ hc(Pwn , RN(n)) + β
′′
n
(c)
≤ hc(Pwn , QN(n)) + β
′′
n + β
′′′
n
(d)
= λ− δm − δ + β
′
n + β
′′
n + β
′′
n
(e)
≤ λ− δn − δ + β
′
n + β
′′
n + β
′′′
n ,
where β′n, β′′n and β′′′n can be made arbitrarily small by increasing n, and where (a) and (c) derive
from the continuity of the hc function and from the fact that QN(n) and RN(n) tend to the same limit,
(b) is due to the fact that rn is the solution of the minimization in (A11), (d) derives from (A10),
and (e) is due to the fact that for a fixed m when n increases δn = |X |[log(n + 1)(N(n) + 1)]/n ≤
|X |[log(m+ 1)(N(m) + 1)]/m = δm.
Equation (A12) proves that Pn ∈ Γ˜ntr,a(QN (n), RN(n)), thus completing the proof of the lemma.
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